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Coercion or Cooperation: Social Policy and Future Trade
Negotiations
Michael Hart*
If carefully managed, unilateral action can spur multilateral agree-
ments - just as a multilateral commitment can facilitate politically
difficult national reforms.
Steve Charnovitz, U.S. environmental and social activist.
In 1988, in the heat of the Canada-U.S. free-trade debate, trade ana-
lysts maintained that trade policy and trade agreements had nothing
to do with social policy and programs. The standard reply to the charge
that the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) would erode Ca-
nada's social safety net was the assertion that trade agreements did not
deal with social programs and any suggestion to the contrary was irre-
sponsible and uninformed. In a narrow sense, that was true. Histori-
cally, social policy had never been an issue in negotiating and imple-
menting trade agreements. Trade agreements dealt with the policies
and programs that governments use to influence the quality and quan-
tity of goods, services, investment and technology that flow across na-
tional frontiers. That is still what trade agreements are largely about.
But, slowly and steadily, we are beginning to recognize that in a global-
ized economy where borders have been largely erased, the policies and
programs that now influence decisions about where to invest and to
what purpose are influenced by a much broader range of government
policies and measures. As a result, governments are beginning to look
at this broader range of measures and are likely to negotiate about
them in order to reduce conflict arising from differing approaches.
Social policies will not escape this broader scrutiny. The primary
goal of trade liberalization agreements is to reduce barriers to interna-
tional transactions and thus contribute to economic growth and pros-
perity. Meeting these goals has social impacts which, as the global
economy becomes more open and integrated, will become sharper and
more important. Traditionally viewed as external to trade negotiations,
social policy issues may now have to become more integral to them in
order to safeguard the ability of governments to continue to pursue
trade liberalization while at the same time promoting the social and
economic welfare of their citizens.
One of the reasons it was possible to dismiss a direct social policy/
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trade policy interface in 1988 was that populist critics of the FTA
made such extravagant claims based on rather heroic assumptions. As
a result, it was possible to ignore the more subtle aspects that now need
to be considered.' Recent discussion of the future multilateral trade
agenda prior to the signing at Marrakesh of the new GATT agree-
ments, however, made it clear that the issue has gained, if not eco-
nomic currency, at least greater political urgency. The United States,
with some support from the EC and other members of the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), is insisting
that GATT begin to address the interaction of two social policy issues
with trade: environmental protection and labor standards. LDCs have
so far quite properly and successfully resisted these calls. They are
right to resist the agenda as currently defined and perceived. Properly
defined, however, as a result of more serious analytical work which
takes into account the changing nature of the organization and struc-
ture of international trade and production, the issues are likely to be
joined, less for economic than for political reasons. The perceived im-
pact of the two sets of policies on each other can no longer be ignored.
Social policy is thus part of a new class of issues arising from what
Sylvia Ostry and others have called system friction. It is in effect an
argument of reaching for a second-best solution in order to avoid much
worse. Governments will respond to the pressures generated by groups
disadvantaged by the forces of globalization and will address the poli-
cies perceived to be the most immediate causes of such disadvantage.
The governments of economically powerful states will seek to imple-
ment solutions that export their political problems, i.e., that will penal-
ize the divergent policies practiced in other jurisdictions. In many
cases, this will involve new barriers to trade. To forestall such distor-
tions, it makes sense to consider negotiating international rules - glob-
ally or regionally - that constrain the ability of powerful states to act
unilaterally. In return, smaller states may need to bring their policies
more into line with those of the powerful. In short, in order to avoid the
tyranny of coercion by the powerful, it may be in the interest of smaller
countries to behave cooperatively and thus constrain the coercive ca-
pacity of the powerful. The challenge is to find the balance between
coercion and cooperation that will appeal to the political needs of both
the small and the big.
The political basis for this new direction in trade policy is much
more robust than its economic foundations. The impact of differing reg-
ulatory regimes on levels of trade, investment and production can easily
be exaggerated. In the case of subsidies, for example, analysts have
long concluded that the economic impact of various subsidy practices is
I See, e.g., CANADIAN COUNCIL ON SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, FREE TRADE AND SOCIAL POL-
ICY (Glenn Drover, ed., Ottawa 1988) for a good example of this kind of intemperate analysis.
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usually quite marginal, but such studies have had little impact on the
ability of affected industries to make a convincing political case for
countervailing duties.2 More recently, industries have begun to argue
about the unfair impact of differing environmental regulations, despite
the rather feeble empirical base for their assertions.- Next we may see
some clever trade lawyer argue that the absence of a comprehensive
social welfare net and the corresponding tax burden constitutes an un-
fair trade advantage. During the debate about the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), opponents insisted that countries
with different levels of social safety nets could not trade with one an-
other under conditions of free trade. Research will probably show the
rather marginal impact of differing social programs on trade and in-
vestment flows, but this will have little impact on the calls by embat-
tled special interests for government action to protect them from what
is characterized as unfair competition.
There is, in addition, a moral dimension. Environmentalists are
convinced that it is the moral duty of the state to take positive steps to
protect the environment and to ensure that internationally involved in-
dustries cannot escape from such regulation through relocation. Simi-
larly, human rights activists are convinced that trade sanctions can be
used as an effective means to improve the observance of human rights
throughout the world while labor leaders believe that minimum levels
of labor legislation should be universally applied and enforced through
trade instruments.
In effect, the old debate about fair trade has now entered a new
and more dangerous phase. A whole range of policy differences among
states are now being cited as creating unfair competition which must
be countered with measures that safeguard one's own policy choices
while keeping the "unfair" competition created by other societies'
choices out of the market. An old idea is being retooled for today's
circumstances. The choice is either to tolerate new forms of protection
or set out to negotiate new rules to keep protectionism at bay.
As national frontiers become increasingly porous and even irrele-
vant and governments respond with new forms of international coopera-
tion to reduce potential conflicts, the scope for independent political
action steadily narrows. Signature of each new international agreement
may reflect a sovereign choice, but the reality is that for many coun-
tries, the choice is more theoretical than real. Thus the issues raised by
the interaction of trade and social policies are both appropriate to a
conference on sovereignty and compelling to anyone interested in either
trade or social policy.
2 See Michael Hart, The Canada-U.S. Working Group on Subsidies: Problem, Solution or
Opportunity? (Occasional Paper, Centre for Trade Policy and Law, Ottawa, 1989).
1 See Michael Hart, Trade and the Environment: Dialogue of the Deaf or Scope for Cooper-
ation?, in 18 Can.-U.S. L.J. (1992).
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Unfortunately, studies analyzing what is involved and what can
usefully be done are only beginning to be undertaken. At this stage,
therefore, it is too early to provide much in the way of startlingly new
insights or compelling new arguments as to why we need to consider
negotiating new international agreements that address the social pol-
icy/trade policy interface. Nevertheless, it is clear that we are headed
in that direction. Whether social policy issues will be negotiated as in-
tegral aspects of the trade agreements of the future or whether interna-
tional instruments on social policy issues will be negotiated on their
own merits is less clear. In either case, however, trade negotiators will
need to begin developing appropriate cross-walks between trade and so-
cial policy issues and trade analysts need to provide government with
the least distorting options.
As such, we cannot go much beyond examining the context which
has given rise to the expectation that social policy and trade policy
need to be addressed jointly and more coherently in international
agreements, the kinds of questions this expectation must give rise to,
the differing kinds of political and analytical approaches that can be
taken to these questions, and the contours of a practical research and
discussion program that will help us think our way through these
issues.
I. WHY Now? - GLOBALIZATION, TRADE AND SOCIAL POLICY
Interaction between trade and social matters, of course, is not new.
Trade takes place within a social and political institutional setting -
domestic and international - that influences who trades what with
whom. In one direction, social issues can raise concerns about the terms
of trade, i.e., the issue of fair competition in terms of both exports and
imports. In the other direction, there are concerns about the effects of
trade on the environment and workers. Trade policy decisions, there-
fore, affect social policy decisions and vice-versa. Government decisions
about social programs, for example, will influence firm investment be-
havior and thus affect future trade and investment flows. Social policies
such as labor market regulations, training programs, environmental
protection laws, health care systems or income support programs all
influence a society's capacity to respond to structural changes, and the
pressure of structural changes will in turn affect the design and deliv-
ery of such programs and policies.
There is thus a complex interplay between social issues and trade
issues. What is new is the extent and intensity of international transac-
tions and their capacity to influence matters that were traditionally ad-
dressed wholly within the confines of the nation state. In the case of
product and process standards, for example, "increasing world eco-
nomic integration through international trade has resulted in increasing
conflicts . . .In a given country, relatively high product standards may
[Vol. 20:351 1994
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restrict imports while comparatively low process standards may in-
crease exports."4 As a result, producers and their governments now
have a greater interest in the social policy decisions made by other gov-
ernments because such decisions are now perceived to have more imme-
diate impacts on their welfare.
Globalization is thus the key to the new urgency in discussions
about the interaction between trade and social issues. Narrowly de-
fined, globalization involves a quantum leap in the internationalization
of the production, distribution and marketing of goods and services.
More loosely understood, however, it invokes a wide variety of political,
sociological, environmental and economic trends based on the processes
that bring people and places together in more frequent contact, more
sustained contact and more varied contact. The globalization experi-
ence of the past few decades has led to a much wider interpretation of
what it means to live in an open economy.
For many firms, the organizational breakthrough that has made
globalization possible is the ability to disperse economic activity geo-
graphically and bring it together electronically. Its realization has led
to spectacular growth in the internationalization of services, particu-
larly financial services, and the further disaggregation of manufactur-
ing. As a result, the future for the advanced industrial economies no
longer lies in standard-technology manufacturing that relies on econo-
mies of scale to reduce costs and maintain competitiveness, but in a
much more sophisticated strategy combining the best in technology,
skills, management and policy. The key to each is information and the
key to the intelligent use of information is the computer. Adopting
computer-based manufacturing and management systems can increase
the productivity of workers, managers and administrative support per-
sonnel alike, decrease the cost of labor, materials, waste disposal, ser-
vice and sales, improve the quality of products and after-market ser-
vice, increase the control of production through inventory control and
waste management and increase customer satisfaction through im-
provement in the quality and differentiation of products and services.
The key to success in manufacturing in the new economy is to integrate
the new technologies with suitable management and production prac-
tices, i.e., integrating the new machinery with the appropriate skills
and management mix.
These developments are leading to fundamental changes in the na-
ture of work and the structure of wages and income distribution involv-
ing a slowdown in the rate of growth of incomes in industrialized coun-
tries, an increase in the inequality of incomes, and a significant increase
in the premium for education. Unskilled labor is now in oversupply on
4 George Foy, Toward Extension of the GATT Standards Code to Production Processes, 26-
6 J. OF WORLD TRADE 121 (Dec. 1992).
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a global basis and skilled/knowledge-intensive labor is in short supply.'
The literature suggests that there were three basic catalysts to the
acceleration of globalization: the steady liberalization of trade and in-
vestment among industrialized countries after the second world war
through a combination of multilateral and regional arrangements and
unilateral measures, the more recent rapid industrialization of the third
world,6 and the impact of technological changes that have brought
down the costs of transportation and communication.7 The effect of
these three factors has been mutually reinforcing and cumulative.8 Of
these three factors, the phenomenal reduction in transportation and
communication costs has made feasible much of the exponential growth
in the activities of financial markets, global firms and strategic alli-
ances. The GATT-based trade regime helped to underwrite this techno-
logically driven integration, while more recent government efforts to
negotiate deeper liberalization and fixed-rule regimes are further rein-
forcing the process of globalization.
The resultant restructuring of global and domestic economies has
generated pressures for change that run against the grain of public
preferences. Keith Banting notes that "the growing integration of world
markets increasingly constrains the autonomy of individual nations, er-
oding their political and social sovereignty; and the dramatic rise of
newly industrializing nations has created an intensely competitive inter-
national trading system." 9 These phenomena are leading to two contra-
See Richard G. Harris, Globalization, trade and income, 26:4 CAN. J. OF ECON., 755-776
(1993) for a good discussion of these factors. In considering these developments and their impact
on trade and social policy issues, it is important to distinguish between the ebb and flow in the
fortunes of individual companies, cyclical forces, and the more fundamental structural changes
taking place. In this paper, it is the latter that is the focus of attention.
6 See, e.g., ADRIAN WOOD, NORTH-SOUTH TRADE, EMPLOYMENT AND INEQUALITY: CHANG-
ING FORTUNES IN A SKILL-DRIVEN WORLD (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).
1 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER FREEMAN & Luc SOETE, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND EM-
PLOYMENT (IBM Europe, Bussels 1994).
Studying the phenomenon of globalization has blurred the lines between various economic
subfields; labor, public finance, industrial organization, monetary and trade all need to be consid-
ered to gain a coherent understanding. Social scientists have been slow to respond, reeling under
the mass of new information undermining the comfortable assumptions that underpinned older
theories. Part of the problem in trying to get a handle on the issue of trade and social policy is
that much of the analysis is taking place from within a paradigm that just does not reflect reality.
Formal trade statistics, for example, no longer capture the reality of the range and depth of inter-
national transactions taking place within firms and within networks of firms. The transmission of
ideas about design, engineering, advertising and sales through sophisticated computer networks
represent international transactions, but are not fully reflected in the trade figures. As a result,
there is a great deal of confusion or what Richard Harris calls "unconstrained theorizing." For
the policy makers, this creates a double bind. There are so many conflicting theories offered by the
experts that it is difficult to know which way to turn while virtually any possible policy choice can
be theoretically justified. See Harris, supra note 5.
" Keith Banting, 13:2 Neoconservatism in an Open Economy: The Social Role of the Cana-
dian State, INT'L POL. SCI. REV. 152 (1992).
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dictory pressures: a pressure to redistribute income to reduce the ad-
justment costs borne by economically weak but politically strong
members of society and a need to reconfigure the social welfare system
and bring it more into line with fiscal reality. In effect, the globaliza-
tion of production is adding to the cost of government social programs
while simultaneously curbing government's ability to generate revenues.
Cost-conscious firms are successfully pursuing location and investment
strategies that minimize their tax exposure at the same time as dis-
placed workers are calling for more retraining and income-support pro-
grams. In virtually every OECD country, the share of government reve-
nue derived from the corporate sector is declining while the share of
government expenditure devoted to social programs is rising.10
II. GLOBALIZATION AND THE END OF THE KEYNESIAN CONSENSUS
The recession of the early 1990s has exacerbated the structural
problems already evident in the 1980s and has added to growing anxi-
ety about the impact of globalization on individuals and firms and the
capacity of the state to pursue and protect national priorities, values
and welfare. During the two decades after the second world war,
largely in response to the crises of depression and war, governments in
the OECD countries forged a series of interlocking policies and pro-
grams that provided the basis for a rising living standard for all seg-
ments of society. This so-called Keynesian consensus, based on large
national firms, unions, and activist governments, created national econ-
omies that deliv;ered high productivity, consumerism and social welfare.
This consensus has now begun to fray under the onslaught of globaliza-
tion. Union power has declined and social safety nets are being chal-
lenged under the pressures of cost competitiveness and fiscal restraint.
Not only are the programs being questioned, but so are many of the
intellectual and policy assumptions that went with that consensus.
Keynesian demand management was critically dependent on the main-
tenance of a largely self-contained national economy. Interdependence
has now changed the rules of the game, and labor, for example, now
faces the unpalatable requirement of having to compete on a broad
scale across frontiers. The desire is to avoid this choice through man-
aged trade, i.e., to rediscover a way to take wage structures out of com-
petition. It is a choice that governments cannot make but that poses a
genuine dilemma.""
As we saw above, the fundamental structural changes undermin-
10 See OECD OBSERVER, various issues, which tracks these numbers on a regular basis.
l' See Ray Marshall, Labor in a Global Economy, in LABOR IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: PER-
SPECTIVES FROM THE U.S. AND CANADA (Steven Hecker & Margaret Hallock, eds., University of
Oregon, 1991) for an excellent discussion of the problems faced by labor in the new circumstances
of a globalizing economy.
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ing the Keynesian consensus can be traced to changes in the technology
and organization of production. The dominant business strategy of the
Keynesian era was mass production, achieved through the specializa-
tion not only of labor but even more of resources, management and
machines. The extent to which this strategy could be implemented was
dependent on final demand which is why demand management was key
to the Keynesian consensus. The cost of specialization requires very
high levels of production. "Mass production as a business strategy is
thus typically accompanied by organizational approaches and market-
ing techniques designed to stabilize the business environment and
maintain large, growing, and predictable markets for standardized
goods."12 The main variable for management is the length of the pro-
duction run, so that it is possible to accept a labor market that takes
wages out of competition. In fact, high wages have the desirable aggre-
gate effect of increasing demand and thus the length of production
runs. It also puts a high premium on stability. Unions may be a nui-
sance but high wages and fringe benefits keep workers on the job and
high wages in turn stimulate high demand for the products of mass
production.
This stable business strategy has been shattered by new informa-
tion processing technologies and the consequent disaggregation of pro-
duction and fragmentation of markets. Rather than productivity im-
provements flowing from access to natural resources and economies of
scale, they now come from improvements in human resources and more
effective ways to organize production. More fundamentally, national
governments can no longer exercise their traditional control over the
national economy and use domestic levers to promote high wages and
full employment. The role of government remains important, but the
old levers are no longer available and new ones remain to be devised.
The past two decades have thus seen the unraveling of the old
strategies based on Keynesian macro-economics and Galbraithean in-
dustrial planning. Peter Dorman complains that "in practical terms,
the consequences of the new global economy are continuing wage ero-
sion, the deterioration of working conditions and social benefits, the loss
of millions of jobs, particularly in manufacturing, the increasing diffi-
culty in expanding or even maintaining levels of unionization, and the
emergence of new pools of low-wage labor in secondary markets - the
first world's Third World."'" These changed conditions fundamentally
alter the structures and policies necessary for welfare and prosperity.
They now require that societies make more effective use of the new
12 Michael Piore, Labor Standards and Business Strategies, in S. HERZENBERG & J. F. PE-
REZ-LOPEZ. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, LABOR STANDARDS AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE GLOBAL ECON-
OMY 40 (1990).
13 Peter Dorman, Trade, Competition, and Jobs: An Internationalist Strategy, in LABOR IN
A GLOBAL ECONOMY 64 (Hecker & Hallock, eds., 1991).
[Vol. 20:351 1994
8
Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 20 [1994], Iss. , Art. 37
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol20/iss/37
Hart-FUTURE TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
factors: quality, productivity and flexibility. The latter, especially in the
use of workers and machines, is critical to future productivity growth
and to competitiveness, more so than lower costs. Ray Marshall notes,
"technology makes new organizations of production possible, but com-
petition makes them necessary." 14 Firms can compete in the global
economy either by reducing costs or by becoming more productive or a
combination thereof. Increasingly, they are re-organizing production in
order to achieve quality, productivity and flexibility, all of which mutu-
ally reinforce each other. The role of workers in these re-organized fa-
cilities is very different. They need to be more flexible and knowledgea-
ble, participate in many more decisions and contribute to the design of
products and processes alike, based on their knowledge and experience.
The structural changes taking place in response to these demands
have exerted considerable pressures on government social programs and
on governments' capacity to continue to shoulder the fiscal burden of
the welfare state. Thus, while the problems being experienced in virtu-
ally all OECD economies derive from a complex array of factors, they
are being transmitted more rapidly throughout the OECD as a result of
the increasing ease of transnational economic transactions. To people
disadvantaged by these structural changes, the solution is simple: slow
down and manage the transmission of these pressures through interna-
tional transactions. The inability of the intellectual community to come
up with politically more attractive policies has added to the political
credibility of these simple answers.
III. LEFT AND RIGHT SQUARE OFF
Globalization has thus fundamentally altered the context within
which governments and other social institutions must function. Analysis
of the challenges posed for governments and society by globalization
falls broadly into two competing perspectives. On one side stand those
who fear that global competition threatens a race to the bottom as un-
principled and unbridled competition erodes labor and other national
standards. In their view, this threat must be met with a concerted effort
to maintain standards that will promote economic and social develop-
ment, nationally and internationally. On the other side stand those who
insist that excessive standards create distortions that undermine the ca-
pacity of firms in one jurisdiction to compete with others in the global
market. In their view, governments should act to reduce or eliminate
unnecessary regulations, including those of labor markets. These two
schools represent the classical divide between emphasis on allocative
efficiency and distributive fairness. The efficiency school contends that
unless market forces are allowed to operate relatively freely, distortions
14 Ray Marshall, Labor in a Global Economy, in LABOR IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note
11, at 14.
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will reduce efficiency, growth and prosperity for all; the equity school
champions the synergistic effect of various distributive strategies on the
modes of production and the scale of consumption. 5
These two perspectives can be characterized in a variety of ways:
left versus right, libertarian versus socialist, equality of opportunity ver-
sus equality of result, populist versus corporate or efficiency versus eq-
uity. Within the social sciences, economists tend to cluster at the effi-
ciency end of the spectrum while sociologists are usually to be found at
the equity end with political scientists somewhere in between. Of
course, there are economists who emphasize equity considerations in
their analysis and sociologists who are aware of the need for efficiency,
but the subject matter of each discipline disposes where its practition-
ers are likely to find themselves on the ideological spectrum. Econo-
mists emphasize the benefits of markets, sociologists see reality in
terms of class struggle, while political scientists concentrate on institu-
tions and political structures. For a cross-cutting issue such as the in-
terface between trade and social policy, these competing analytical sys-
tems tend to color much of the analysis. and search for solutions. In
terms of influence on public policy, the views of economists have long
been dominant in the area of international trade while the sociologists
have been the analysts of choice in the design of many social programs.
In the new circumstances of a globalized economy both may need to
learn from each other in devising solutions that last."6
15 For a discussion of these two perspectives in the context of labor standards, see Stephen A.
Herzenberg, Jorge F. Perez-Lopez & Stuart K. Tucker, Introduction, in LABOR STANDARDS AND
DEVELOPMENT IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (1990).
Is We live in an age of specialization, including in the academic community. Specialists,
expert in increasingly small slices of reality, rule the day. Not only do we have robust departments
of economics, political science and sociology, but within these disciplines, sub-fields have become
as isolated from each other as the main disciplines have from other intellectual pursuits. Cross-
disciplinary studies, much in vogue a few years ago, are now dismissed as the work of dilettantes.
As a result, the academic community is filled with erudite tree inspectors lost in the forest of
reality. Borrowing from literary criticism, social scientists have learned to deconstruct society into
its most minute aspects, but like English professors, they similarly fail to appreciate that the
whole is more than the sum of its parts. With a few notable exceptions, most of the social scien-
tists who write about economic policy issues, the functioning of the economy and the role of gov-
ernment know little about business and government. A great many economists, for example, write
about the way the economy functions on the basis of statistics rather than an intimate knowledge
of the firm and how it operates. Many political scientists write about government decision-making
without ever having read a cabinet memo or talked to a civil servant. This characteristic of aca-
demic analysis is particularly true of those on the ideological extremes where well-developed theo-
retical frameworks do not leave much room for the shades of gray that would enter with real-
world observation and knowledge. Even centrist analysts, however, when they stray from their
little slice of specialized knowledge, are most comfortable fitting the rest of their analysis within
the confines of well-trodden academic paradigms rather than pursuing the common sense observa-
tions that rule the rest of their lives. When it comes to their academic work, they reason that
common sense is a most unreliable guide because it is so common. An interesting description of
the shortcomings of mainstream economic analysis can be found in WILLIAM LAZONICK. BUSINESS
[Vol. 20:351 1994
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The efficiency school, which places its faith in markets and indi-
vidualism and which provided the intellectual underpinning for the
GATT and other postwar international economic institutions, sees the
extension of the market model as critical to future global economic
growth, providing an ever-expanding pie through specialization and the
international division of labor. The equity school, on the other hand,
looks to the establishment of a global economy that in many ways rep-
licates internationally the success of the national Keynesian economy of
the 1950s and 1960s. It would require the establishment of institutional
and regulatory structures internationally to guide the harmonious de-
velopment of mutually reinforcing social and economic goals at a global
level.
A major difference between the efficiency and equity schools is
their view of the role of the state. The efficiency school concedes an
important place to government in the establishment and maintenance
of standards - whether for health care, education, housing or urban
planning - but believes that the private sector is best placed to provide
these societal services on a competitive basis. Governments should be
involved in their delivery only in cases of market failure. For the equity
school, governments should be involved not only in the design of stan-
dards, but also in the delivery of programs on the basis of both monop-
oly and universal access, with payment coming through a progressive
tax system, thus reserving to the state two sometimes conflicting re-
sponsibilities. To the efficiency school, government should be involved
in establishing an appropriate framework through both macro and reg-
ulatory policies within which the private sector can function effectively
and efficiently (i.e., concentrate on the supply side of the economy and
on promoting allocative efficiency) while the equity school is more in-
terested in government using its powers to manage demand (i.e., the
promotion of distributive justice).
A second strand is a moral one: free-market forces, while highly
suited to the creation of wealth, are less well suited to addressing the
question of its equitable distribution. Government policies, therefore,
are directed to responding to the demands for equity, based on a demo-
cratic consensus on what that might be at any one time. There is al-
ways a delicate trade-off between the search for efficiency and equity.
Too much of one will tend to harm the other. Finding the balance be-
tween equity and efficiency is made immensely more complicated in an
integrated global economy where the coincidence of boundaries be-
tween political and economic markets has broken down.
Much of the debate between left and right is thus whether the
economic or political market will be the ultimate determinant of social
choices. To libertarians, only by letting consumers have choice can we
ORGANIZATION AND THE MYTH OF THE MARKET ECONOMY (Cambridge University Press, 1991).
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preserve freedom; the path of governments deciding who will produce
what and who will consume it not only robs the consumer of choice, but
ultimately threatens political liberties as well. Thus to neo-conserva-
tives like David Frum, George Gilder and Michael Novak, traditional
political rights should not be diluted by the acceptance of new eco-
nomic and social rights. 17 Political liberty can only be preserved on the
basis of governments that recognize both their limits and their duties.
The main function of government is to preserve the rule of law, guaran-
tee the protection of private property and underwrite social order and
security. To them, the Keynesian consensus contained the seeds of its
own demise. Rather than realizing its goal of socializing the means of
production, it succeeded in socializing the means of consumption. In
Canada, for example, the state considerably expanded its role from
that of promoting economic development to that of guarantor of a ris-
ing level of social security and an amenable lifestyle through an in-
creasing array of programs. As a result, political rather than economic
factors govern levels of consumption, a situation that is ultimately not
sustainable.
To analysts like Frum, Gilder and Novak, the difference between
the economic and political market is that in the economic market,
prices bear a relationship to cost and therefore exert a discipline on
consumer choice that is absent in the political market; indeed, in the
political market, many have become convinced that there is no price
tag; someone else will pay for the goodies distributed by a benevolent
government. The crisis of the industrialized democracies today is that
the profligacy of Keynesian demand management has come home to
roost. There are not enough plutocrats to pay for the benefits voted by
the proletariat. Social activists continue to believe there is unlimited
wealth to tap in the corporate sector but to the previous limits imposed
by falling returns to entrepreneurship must now be added the ability of
most entrepreneurs to escape to a less constraining environment to pur-
sue their interests. Neo-conservative thinkers like Gilder further sug-
gest that, ironically, the strongest support for the welfare state comes
not from the working classes and the poor, many of whom have visions
of making it in the market economy, but from the media-bureaucratic
university community, i.e., from those with secure salaried positions
who are dependent on providing many of the services and programs of
the welfare state.
Their view is not shared by all economists and is hotly contested
See, e.g., DAVID FRuM. DEAD RIGHT (Basic Books, 1994); GEORGE GILDER. RECAPTUR-
ING THE SPIRIT OF ENTERPRISE (ICS Press, 1992); and MICHAEL NOVAK. THE SPIRIT OF DEMO-
CRATIC CAPITALISM (Simon and Schuster, 1982). The thinking of Gilder, Novak and other leading
members of the neo-conservative movement is well-captured by GARY DORRIEN. THE NEOCON-
SERVATIVE MIND: POLITICS. CULTURE AND THE WAR OF IDEOLOGY (Temple University Press,
1993).
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by many political scientists and most sociologists. Neo-institutional
economists, for example, insist that properly conceived and applied in-
ternational and domestic labor standards can be important tools for en-
suring that economic and social development are mutually reinforcing
and harmonious. Scholars like Michael Piore, Ray Marshall and Patri-
cia Marchak believe that the neoclassical market model distorts the
reality of national markets and how they interact internationally. In
reality, national economies consist of a set of institutional arrangements
that simultaneously perform political, social and economic functions. In
their view, efficiency is a dynamic rather than static concept and is
influenced by institutional factors such as business organization and the
regulatory framework. Piore argues, for example, that labor standards
can force business to turn to productivity and quality-based strategies
rather than the low-cost competition that flows from unfettered market
forces."8
For neo-institutionalists, it is the proper role of government to de-
vise a regulatory framework which will allow both social and economic
goals to be achieved in a synergistic manner and to block undesirable
business strategies. They argue that the broader institutions of society,
including government, provide the context within which industrializa-
tion takes place. In the post-war period, national systems of interlock-
ing macro and micro policies and other aspects of governance created
unique patterns of national economic development. They argue that in
most OECD countries, high standards and wages increased aggregate
demand and induced higher employment. As a result, they take com-
fort from the lessons of the so-called Golden Age of industrialization in
the OECD countries - the period of the Keynesian consensus - when
high standards and wages prevented a second outbreak of the under-
consumption and depression that had characterized the 1930s. The
trick now is to replicate these conditions at a global level or protect
national economies from the inroads of globalism.
An important determinant of one's analysis of these issues is one's
view of the role and influence of government policies in determining
international trade and investment flows and the success or failure of
firms and industries. This in turn leads to different views of the desira-
bility of international negotiations to reduce the policy differences be-
tween governments. There are various interventionist schools who are
convinced that the role of government is determinative and can be
deployed strategically to provide nations with competitive advantages
increasing national rents from trade; there are others who are willing to
concede an important influence to government policies but argue that
18 See, e.g., RAY MARSHALL, UNHEARD VOICES: LABOR AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN A COM-
PETITIVE WORLD (Basic Books, 1987); MICHAEL PIORE & CHARLES SABEL, THE SECOND INDUS-
TRIAL DIVIDE (New York: Basic Books, 1984); or PATRICIA MARCHAK. THE INTEGRATED CIRCUS:
THE NEW RIGHT AND THE RESTRUCTURING OF GLOBAL MARKETS (McGill-Queen's Press, 1991).
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the effect is rarely the same as the desire. The world of international
trade and investment would probably be better off with less rather than
more government intervention. Finally, there are those who believe that
government regulatory activity provides influence only at the margin.
One of the problems with issues of this kind, of course, is that the
theorists tend to pose the problems and solutions in black and white
terms, whereas reality involves many shades of gray. A lot of the
problems of strategic trade theory, for example, flow from the tyranny
of trying to find an explanation that can be modeled. Theoretical analy-
sis may help us to understand reality better, but it rarely provides a
satisfactory basis for designing practical solutions. In an imperfect
world of human institutions requiring compromise, the challenge is to
find approaches that reflect a reasonable degree of reality. The 1947
GATT, as conceived and as it grew, represented such a solution, but no
longer reflects reality nor a sufficient solution to the problems of the
day.
Today's political reality is that while there is wide global conver-
gence around macro-economic neo-classical prescriptions because it
was learned, often painfully, that the Keynesian consensus had limited
application in an open economy, there continues to be broad support for
many of the components of the welfare state. Therein lies part of the
challenge faced by the trade policy community. The trade and pay-
ments system conceived in the 1940s exercised neo-classical disciplines
on its members' macro-economic and border policies but left room for
Keynesian experimentation within their respective domestic economies.
Now that national economies have become much more integrated into
a single global economy, the contradiction between the two regimes has
become painfully apparent. The crisis in the advanced industrial econo-
mies, therefore, is how long the welfare state can remain intact in an
open global economy. The efficiency school insists that it is not sustain-
able, while those espousing equity maintain that it must and it can be
sustained through a variety of active labor and adjustment policies and
other forms of government intervention and planning.
It is thus not difficult to appreciate why the forces of globalization
have now disposed both left and right to consider the need for rules
about social issues in international trade agreements, although for very
different reasons and for achieving very different goals. The focus today
is on the two squeaky wheels of environmental and labor issues, but it
will enlarge to a broader range of social policy issues as awareness of
the reality of a global economy grows. For the right, international rules
can be used to create a level playing field, disciplining governments
from capriciously interfering in the efficient operation of the market.
For the left, the ideal line of defense is to isolate national economies
from the rigors of competing in the international economy so that gov-
ernments remain free to maintain their own social programs; that is
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why populist, left-wing groups mounted such a virulent attack on the
Canada-US FTA in Canada and on the NAFTA in the United States;
both agreements threaten a potential loss of control. Having conceded,
however, that the clock is unlikely to be turned back, they now see the
next challenge to be the negotiation of international agreements that
can be used as instruments to create a universal Keynesian welfare
state, guaranteed by international treaty. Their revised preference can
be seen in the call for agreements enforcing environmental protection
and international fair labor standards. Like conservatives, they can ap-
preciate the utility of international rule-making to reinforce their goals
domestically.
The task will not be easy. If any of the various analytical models
of economic growth and development were fully persuasive, then it
would be a relatively simple task to make policy that would ensure de-
sirable ends and a better future. But we cannot even agree about the
past, let alone predict the future. Each model provides insight into an
aspect of the human condition, some doing a better or more convincing
job than others. Because reality is constantly changing, is infinitely
complex and involves many variables, we never quite capture the
whole. The task of devising policy is made even more complicated by
the fact that we constantly confuse the positive and normative dimen-
sions of the various slices of reality under scrutiny. As Arthur Okun
has argued:
A democratic capitalist society will keep searching for better ways of
drawing the boundary lines between the domain of rights and the do-
main of dollars. And it can make progress. To be sure, it will never
solve the problem, for the conflict between equality and economic effi-
ciency is inescapable. In that sense, capitalism and democracy are re-
ally a most improbable mixture. Maybe that is why they need each
other - to put some rationality into equality and some humanity into
efficiency.1"
IV. Is THERE AN ECONOMIC CASE?
Given the cacophony of conflicting voices in the academy, is it pos-
sible to construct an economically convincing case for integrating social
policy disciplines into trade agreements? From the perspective of neo-
classicial economics, the answer would appear to be a resounding no.20
Neo-institutionalists, on the other hand, are ready to tackle the project,
even if it places in jeopardy the open, multilateral trade regime so care-
19 ARTHUR OKUN. EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF, 120 (The Brookings In-
stitution 1975).
20 See, e.g., William Watson, A Skeptical View of the Social Charter, in TIES BEYOND
TRADE: LABOR AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES UNDER THE NAFTA (Jonathan Lemco & William
B.P. Robson, eds., C.D. Howe, 1993).
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fully built up over the past fifty years. Other analysts, not convinced
that either of these schools of thought represents a wholly satisfactory
explanation, are reconsidering the theoretical underpinnings of main-
stream economics in an effort to gain a better understanding of the
nature of global commerce and its role in economic growth and
development.
Ever since the days of Alfred Marshall, economic analysis has
been dominated by those trying to perfect a general theory that as-
sumes a highly stylized world of perfect competition among individual
producers and consumers. The objective is to understand the forces that
keep the economy in equilibrium. Mainstream economics has managed
to accommodate some of the insights of dissenters like Schumpeter and
Keynes, but the core of the faith has remained rigorously neo-classical,
even in the face of a growing gap between theory and reality. The areas
of change that are critical to understanding the globalization of the
economy - changes in the technology and organization of production
and in the institutional and governmental setting - are all areas that
mainstream economic analysis has had difficulty integrating into its
theoretical framework. As noted by William Lazonick, "Mainstream
economics contains no theory of innovation and no theory of competi-
tive advantage ... [while] history shows that the driving force of suc-
cessful capitalist development is not the perfection of the market mech-
anism but the building of organizational capabilities."'" Thus it is
analysts who are skeptical of the claims of neo-classicism who are at
the forefront of those trying to understand the momentous changes tak-
ing place around us, including important work on growth theory, trade,
industrial organization, technology and more. The result is an exciting
period of debate in the academy but confusion in governments and else-
where as various new schools of thought offer often conflicting policy
advice.22
What is missing is a satisfactory general theory that builds on the
21 WILLIAM LAZONICK, supra note 16, at 7-8.
22 Stimulating analysis of the transformation taking place and its implications for both theo-
retical work and policy development can be found in the work of a group of scholars interested in
understanding the role of technology in economic growth and development. Building on the ideas
of earlier economists like Schumpeter and Kondratief, people like Christopher Freeman, Luc
Soete, Keith Pavitt, Carlotta Perez, Richard Nelson, Nathan Rosenberg, David Mowery and
others are developing new insights into the nature of growth and economic development. The
phrase techno-economic paradigm shift to describe this transformation was first used by Carlotta
Perez and is described by her and Christopher Freeman in Structural crises of adjustment: busi-
ness cycles and investment behaviour, in TECHNICAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC THEORY (Soete et.
al., eds., Pinter, 1988). See also LONG WAVES IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (Freeman, ed., Pinter,
1984). For a Canadian perspective, see Richard G. Lipsey, Notes on the Changing
Technoeconomic Paradigm and Some Implications for Economic Policy, Mimeo, Canadian Insti-
tute for Advanced Research, Program in Economic Growth and Policy, Simon Fraser University
(1993) and Richard G. Harris, Trade, Money, and Wealth in the Canadian Economy, Benefactors
Lecture, C. D. Howe Institute, Toronto (September 14, 1993).
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central role of the market but accounts for the influence of technology,
organizations and institutions and deals with the economy in its global
setting. Unfortunately, none of the other schools of economic analysis
provides a satisfactory alternative. Marxism is even more stylized and
removed from reality than neo-classicism while neo-institutionalism,
the French modes-of-regulation school and new theories on technology
and dynamic growth are as yet incomplete. What is needed is someone
of the stature of a Marshall or Keynes to devise a new general theory
that combines the insights of these various schools and applies them to
the new reality of a global economy.23 Until then, we will have to limp
along on the basis of the current state of highly debatable analysis.
Most theories of international trade, for example, assume that
trade takes place between unrelated firms located in different countries,
i.e., a product is exported by a willing seller located in one country to a
willing buyer located in another. More and more, however, trade takes
place within the firm or within strategic alliances, i.e., between
branches of a single corporation or within networks of strategically al-
lied firms, and decisions about what to invest and where are dictated by
a broad range of factors. Neither existing trade theory nor current the-
ories about the firm deal adequately with the complexities of a world
dominated by large global corporations trading and investing relatively
freely throughout the globe and increasingly able to evade unwelcome
forms of government regulation and taxation.
It is within this new and more complex set of circumstances that
we must consider whether there is now a stronger economic case for
tying social policy more clearly into the disciplines of international
trade agreements, with the particular case of labor standards providing
the most urgent example. Consideration starts with the problems raised
by the secular decline in manufacturing employment in virtually every
OECD country. In terms of output, manufacturing's share of GNP has
remained fairly steady over the past fifty years, but its share of employ-
ment has steadily declined. Technological developments and productiv-
ity improvements have steadily lowered the relative costs of goods and
reduced the value-added that labor provides. At the same time, rela-
tively lower productivity improvements in the service sector have led to
relatively higher costs and higher requirements for labor. These two
secular movements have steadily increased the share of GNP and em-
23 To be fair, that is exactly what Richard Lipsey and his colleagues are working towards at
the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research. See, e.g., RICHARD LIPSEY. CANADIAN INSTITUTE
FOR ADVANCED RESEARCH, ECONOMIC GROWTH: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AND INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (Toronto, study number 4, June, 1991). Lipsey presents a devas-
tating analysis of the shortcomings of neoclassical theory and the promise of the new growth
theory. Unlike many critics of neoclassicism, however, Lipsey does not make the mistake of equat-
ing defense of the market with neoclassicism. The market, which has been the bedrock of Western
economic development, rests on more secure foundations than neoclassical equilibrium theory.
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ployment devoted to services."'
The decline in demand for traditional jobs is, of course, typical of
a period of major economic transformation. In the century since 1880,
technological changes destroyed about two-thirds of the jobs then in
existence but at the same tripled the number of people employed.
Long-term aggregate patterns, however, contain within them a variety
of less stable shorter-term and industry specific sub-patterns which give
rise to the need for offsetting social policies. The social policy concern
is thus not about absolute levels of employment in the long run, but the
amount of churning and mismatch as some jobs disappear, others are
created and people adjust to changing circumstances.2 5
That churning has caused a lot of anger and frustration within the
labor movement and that anger is creating pressure on governments to
respond. Part of this anger, of course, is rooted in ideology. Many labor
leaders and their intellectual advisors see the world in terms of class
struggle. They identify organized labor as workers exploited by a capi-
talist class that seeks unfettered rights to profit and uses the state as
one of its agents of coercion. In its more extreme views, existing inter-
national regimes are seen as advancing the exploitive role of the large
firm, and now becoming stateless and even less responsible. Most of
this line of reasoning is a populist version of Marxist economic deter-
minism. It bears no more resemblance to the real world than the mech-
anistic analysis of neoclassical trade theory. Pursuing this ideological
trail will do little in helping to confront the real issue of trying to find a
balance in the pursuit of conflicting trade and social policy objectives.
But this anger is also rooted in the genuine hardships flowing from
globalization. To get costs down, firms are lowering wage costs, chang-
ing the structure of work and work rules, closing down inefficient facili-
ties, and raising productivity through capital improvements, technologi-
cal innovations and relocation. The resulting labor relations atmosphere
is chaotic and strained. Even more to the point, the labor movement is
trying to come to grips with the fact that the wage gap is becoming
increasingly real between high- and low-wage countries as modern
technology and management techniques are wiping out the productivity
gap and modern, low-cost transportation and communications technolo-
gies make location a less critical factor. Organized labor fears that
" See Paul Krugman, Competitiveness: A Dangerous Delusion, 73-2 FOREIGN AFF. (1994)
and Paul Krugman and Robert Lawrence, Trade, Jobs and Wages, Sci. AM., April 1994 at 44-49.
21 See Fred Wien, INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON PUBLIC POLICY, THE ROLE OF SOCIAL POL-
ICY IN ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING (Halifax, 1991). There are, of course, other factors at play
which affect aggregate levels of employment, including labor participation rates influenced by
demographic patterns, women entering the work force, length of education, availability of alter-
nate sources of income through various social programs, and more. For a good discussion of long-
term trends in economic growth and development over the past century, see William J. Baumol,
Sue Anne Batey Blackman and Edward N. Wolff, PRODUCTIVITY AND AMERICAN LEADERSHIP:
THE LONG VIEW (The MIT Press, 1989).
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based on current trends, it will not be long before most demand in
OECD economies can be satisfied either by large, highly automated
factories running 24 hours a day on the basis of a few managerial and
maintenance workers, or by imports produced in low-cost labor coun-
tries. At the aggregate level, the introduction of labor-saving technol-
ogy generates new kinds of labor requirements, productivity improve-
ments and cost reductions, but such changes also have effects on
distributional and employment patterns which cannot be ignored by
governments.2"
Within organized labor and among analysts who share their con-
cerns, there is a clear split between those who believe that the differ-
ence in wage structures is the crux of the matter and those who recog-
nize that differences in wage structures are a normal reflection of
different national and regional endowments. To these more moderate
analysts, different wage levels are acceptable as long as they are freely
arrived at and are not the product of coercive institutional and govern-
mental factors. In OECD economies, well developed labor and other
laws ensure that wages reflect a non-coercive labor market; such is not
always the case in developing or low-wage economies.2 7
For more militant members of organized labor, the preferred strat-
egy is to continue to isolate national economies from low-wage interna-
tional competition so that wage and related labor-market issues can be
addressed within the limits of a single national economy. To ensure
compliance, trade would only take place among economies at similar
levels of development and be managed on an agreed basis among those
countries. For more moderate analysts, however, a more practical ap-
proach is seen to lie in the promotion of workers' rights at a global level
and their enforcement through trade agreements. Five workers' rights,
recognized as such by the International Labor Organization (ILO), are
considered central to the development of proper international stan-
28 See Wien, THE ROLE OF SOCIAL POLICY, supra note 25, for a more detailed discussion of
this problem.
27 Of course, if the object of the game is to raise standards in those countries, the evidence
suggests that the best way is to trade with them and let economic development lead to internal
pressures for higher standards. Gary Fields indicates that the evidence in a range of LDCs sug-
gests that the imposition of labor standards, particularly relating to minimum wages and working
conditions, leads to higher labor costs and lower employment. The Far East experience is that
workers benefit most from government efforts that encourage investment in labor-intensive activi-
ties within a framework that lets markets dictate outcomes. The data is compelling. Since the
1960s, when full employment was reached in economies such as Singapore, Korea, Taiwan and
Hong Kong, the mix of jobs improved; real wages rose, by as much as a factor of four; and high
work-place standards and income inequality remained at low to moderate levels. In short, workers
in these economies were not impoverished by economic growth, but benefited from it. Little of this
was achieved, however, with the help of labor unions and formal labor standards. In other words,
the four tigers have proven deficient in process but outstanding in outcome. See Labor Standards,
Economic Development, and International Trade, in LABOR STANDARDS AND DEVELOPMENT IN
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (1990).
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dards: the right of association, the right to organize and bargain collec-
tively, the prohibition of forced labor, a minimum age for the employ-
ment of children, and minimum conditions of work including wages,
hours and occupational health and safety.z8
For analysts like Ray Marshall, effective labor movements must
thus also have global strategies that are designed to support high-wage,
full employment, equity policies that match the strategies of the firm.
In his view, markets work within a framework of rules that promote a
range of non-economic or market-supporting policies. In this context,
governments routinely act to force companies to compete on the basis
of quality, productivity and efficiency, not low wages. "In a global
economy, however, labor standards must now be part of international
trade rules." Such rules would establish fair labor standards and prac-
tices, including rules that would prevent wage suppression in order to
attract investment. In his view, international labor standards would
promote equitable economic development in the third world and pre-
vent a destructive downward spiral of deregulation among OECD
countries.29
These arguments, however, are largely political. The economic ba-
sis for them remains weak. The pure wage argument, of course, seeks
to deny the very basis for international trade. Policies, domestic or in-
ternational, that would take wages out of international competition
would in effect close down a substantial portion of international trade.
The regulatory argument, however, is more subtle. It can be summa-
rized as follows: footloose firms use the promise of new investment or
the threat of disinvestment to convince governments to relax regulatory
requirements and tax burdens; the resulting erosion of the tax base
reduces the capacity of governments to maintain a viable social safety
net to the detriment of society as a whole; and the capacity of firms to
disaggregate the production process and locate slices of it in different
areas of the globe has led to the equalization of wage levels. High-
skilled labor is in high demand and relatively scarce and is thus highly
rewarded while low-skill labor is relatively abundant and in declining
demand, thus depressing wages. The reinforcing interrelationship be-
tween these three factors suggests to proponents of this view, that gov-
ernments need to find ways to regulate the capacity of private capital
to move between and within jurisdictions in an effort to find the most
congenial regulatory and fiscal locations. Given the interdependence of
modern economies, no government can afford to act alone. Only by act-
ing collectively can regulations thwarting the irresponsible behavior of
private capital be implemented. In the absence of such regulations, la-
28 Peter Dorman, Trade, Competition, and Jobs: An Internationalist Strategy, in LABOR IN
A GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 13, at 66.
29 Ray Marshall, Labor in a Global Economy, in LABOR IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note
11, at 21.
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bor will continue to bear the brunt of adjustment to globalization.
The argument has a surface plausibility. Empirical research, how-
ever, suggests that while environment, labor and other social policies
have some effect on investment decisions, that effect is quite small and
certainly much smaller than critics of trade liberalization imagine it to
be. The question is whether businesses will relocate because of lower
regulatory costs or whether they will simply take advantage of lower
regulatory costs once relocated. The incentive to take advantage of
lower requirements once in a location, e.g., to factor in lower regulatory
costs when contemplating a new investment or a decision to relocate,
and the decision to relocate because of such factors are quite different.
For global enterprises, locational decisions are influenced by a variety
of factors, including access to materials, energy resources and markets,
labor supply and costs, infrastructure availability and costs (such as
transportation, electricity, water and waste disposal), capital availabil-
ity and costs, the potential for economies of scale and scope, govern-
mental measures (such as taxes, regulations and incentives), and site
costs. Additionally, there are less tangible influences such as the site
preferences of managers influenced by the availability of suitable
schooling, housing and other amenities, as well as familiarity with the
available options. Finally, historical investment patterns suggest a
strong bias toward clustering, i.e., a bias to locate close to other firms
involved in similar activity. Carpet makers, for example, are concen-
trated around Dalton, Georgia while computer firms have clustered in
Silicon Valley south of San Francisco, along route 128 near Boston and
in the Ottawa valley. The weighting to be assigned to these various
factors can vary widely from industry to industry and firm to firm. In
most industries, regulatory costs are but a small fraction of total costs
and are thus unlikely to weigh very heavily in such decisions. Studies of
environmental costs, for example, indicate that they typically involve
less than 1 %, with only a few industries reaching 2 to 3 %.30
Most of the cases of relocation to take advantage of lower social
costs rests on anecdotal evidence, rather than systematic investigation.
During the NAFTA debate, for example, most of the anecdotal evi-
dence revolved around Los Angeles wood products manufacturers. All
efforts at systematic investigation have tended to debunk the claim that
firms will move to avoid regulatory requirements. In most cases, the
30 See Frederick W. Mayer, The NAFTA, Multinationals and Social Policy, in MULTINA-
TIONALS IN NORTH AMERICA (Lorraine Eden, ed., University of Calgary Press, 1994) for a discus-
sion of the intricacies of locational decisions. Patrick Low indicates that for the United States, the
weighted average cost to output of pollution abatement and control equipment was 0.54 percent,
with the highest ratio, for the cement industry, being just over three percent. See World Bank,
Trade Measures and Environmental Quality: Implications for Mexico's Exports, 159 INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT. WORLD BANK DISCUSSION PAPER 107 (Patrick Low, ed.,
1992).
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important factor was not regulatory costs but labor costs and involved
only partial relocations of labor-intensive slices of production. The
NAFTA debate focused on the appalling social and environmental con-
ditions in the maquiladora border regions of Mexico. There are many
horror stories, but the debate unfairly tarred all plants with the same
brush; many of the newer investments, particularly by multinational
firms, do not exhibit the same problems and generally have their own
global standards. Finally, the NAFTA experience also suggested that
the problem is less due to a lack of labor standards and other laws, and
more due to a lack of economic capacity and political will to enforce
them. With further economic development, in part spurred by more
open international trade and investment conditions, the economic ca-
pacity should improve while international agreements can act to in-
crease political will.31
The only conclusion we can draw is that while the ethical case for
worker rights may be strong, the economic case remains problematic. It
needs evidence based on reputable studies to determine the relationship
between workers' rights, wage levels, competitiveness and investment
patterns. To date, most of the evidence is based on deductive reasoning
and anecdotal examples.
As with the particular case of labor regulations, the more general
social policy case rests on similarly tenuous economic arguments. There
is no denial that the modern welfare state is expensive and thus re-
quires a high level of taxation; most OECD governments have learned
over the past decade that their capacity to raise revenue has fallen far
short of their requirements as the cost of maintaining the welfare state
continues to grow. Not only have cost projections proven unrealistic,
but behavioral changes flowing from the welfare state have driven up
demand for services beyond the state's capacity to pay. At the same
time, the institutional and other benefits that flow from a well-ordered
modern society continue to make investment location (except for the
most routine tasks) more attractive in high-cost economies than in low-
cost economies. The unprecedented surge in foreign direct investment
in the 1980s was almost exclusively an intra-OECD phenomenon. The
problems of the welfare state, real as they may be, do not appear to be
a major factor in international investment decisions and need to be ad-
dressed on a basis other than trade agreements.
Additionally, the need for governments to pay for the fiscal burden
of the welfare state through international borrowing is leading to a dis-
cipline of its own. Such disciplines should not be confused with the kind
of disciplines that can be exercised through trade agreements. The abil-
ity of governments to borrow from domestic and international lenders is
11 See Mayer, The NAFTA, Multinationals and Social Policy, in MULTINATIONALS IN
NORTH AMERICA, supra note 30, at 514-15.
[Vol. 20:351 1994
22
Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 20 [1994], Iss. , Art. 37
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol20/iss/37
Hart-FUTURE TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
directly related to the confidence such lenders have in the fiscal and
monetary probity of the borrowing state and is expressed in exchange
and interest rates. Again, these are self-regulating levers for national
participation in a global economy. They function at the aggregate,
macro-economic level and do not need trade agreements to make them
work.
V. IF NOT AN ECONOMIC CASE, How ABOUT A POLITICAL CASE?
If the economic case for integrating social issues more coherently
and systematically into trade agreements is weak or premature, why
then continue the discussion? The reason is that feeble as the economic
case may be, the political case is very potent. As has been demon-
strated countless times before, governments, particularly of large, pow-
erful states, will respond when there is a strong political case, even in
the face of their own skepticism about the economic case. The eco-
nomic case for antidumping and countervailing duties, for example, has
never been very strong. If anything, the steady reduction in other trade
barriers and the globalization of production have further undermined
the economic rationale. Nevertheless, the proliferation of antidumping
regimes continues and new antidumping and countervailing duty cases
are initiated daily. Deeply entrenched domestic interests continue to
convince governments to impose such duties and provide domestic pro-
ducers an advantage over foreign producers, even as the distinction be-
tween foreign and domestic producers becomes ever more artificial.
The political case for negotiating international rules to govern the
interrelationship between trade and social issues is thus relatively
straightforward. It rests on the larger risk posed by the willingness of
large and powerful countries to act unilaterally in response to domestic
political pressures arising from perceptions of fairness. Such a develop-
ment could lead to a significant erosion in the gains from fixed-rule,
non-discriminatory, liberalizing trade agreements. As noted by GATT
Director General, Peter Sutherland: "The use of [unilateral] trade re-
strictions to spur nations to raise standards and to penalize those lag-
ging behind can be a powerful political club but it is unlikely to achieve
the objective. Like all clubs it is most available to the strong for use on
the weak. And introducing this weapon into the world trading system
would put it at immediate risk of collapse. ' 3 2
Sutherland is both right and wrong. Unilateralism does breed con-
tempt and cynicism and can lead to an erosion of the rule of law. Nev-
ertheless, such sentiments, when properly channeled, can also lead to
cooperative solutions that in the end may prove beneficial. Such cooper-
ative international solutions can help both strong and weak deal with
the need to find delicate compromises among competing domestic polit-
22 TORONTO GLOBE AND MAIL, May 16, 1994, at B10.
23
Hart: Coercion or Cooperation; Social Policy and Future Trade Negotiati
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 1994
CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL
ical interests. This is not a new development, of course. The history of
international trade negotiation reflects the continuing dominance of po-
litical considerations over economic ones. The GATT, for example, has
always been a disappointment to mainstream economists. It is based on
too many compromises. Its rules permit governments to impose a vari-
ety of trade-restricting measures, such as tariffs, quantitative restric-
tions, discriminatory government procurement provisions, and anti-
dumping and countervailing duties. Nevertheless, the cumulative effect
of GATT's rules and procedures has been to impose an upper limit on
resort to such measures while its periodic negotiating conferences have
succeeded both in reducing barriers and strengthening the rule of law.
Perversely, therefore, a set of rules and procedures that may be eco-
nomically irrational can result in an economically desirable result, i.e.,
a more efficient allocation of global resources leading to steady in-
creases in global, and national, economic welfare.
Globalization suggests that we now take another step in the same
direction. The arguments that made the international regulation of bor-
der and related measures desirable and effective over the past fifty
years should now be applied to the kinds of domestic policy instruments
governments use to pursue social objectives. The conflict created by dif-
fering regulatory regimes can be ameliorated by negotiating rules that
place a limit on the degree of divergence that participating govern-
ments will tolerate and at the same time constrain governments from
taking unilateral action to offset perceived negative effects. In short,
negotiations about rules are likely to accelerate efforts to reduce regu-
latory differences while their absence is unlikely to slow ongoing silent
integration and the resultant scope for conflict and unilateralism.33
The real issue, therefore, is not whether governments will negoti-
ate about these issues, but where and to what purpose. The pressure to
act is already there. Effective lobbying by a broad coalition of environ-
mental, labor, human rights, religious and citizens groups concerned
about job loss and erosion of regulatory standards has already made
the political case that there is a relationship between trade liberalizing,
fixed-rule agreements and social and environmental degradation. Part
of the case, of course, is pure strategic opportunism: interest groups are
able to hold a politically important trade issue (e.g., passage of
NAFTA or the Uruguay Round results) ransom to demands to meet
their own agenda (e.g., tougher environmental and labor regulation and
" The relationships, however, are complex and can be easily exaggerated in political dia-
logue. Frederick Mayer notes, "The relationship between government regulatory regimes and pri-
vate investment locational decisions demonstrates that causality can run in both directions. Differ-
ences in costs imposed by differences in political regimes can affect private location decisions.
Conversely, the possibility of such private relocations can trigger a political response that limits
the incentives to flee." Mayer, The NAFTA, Multinationals and Social Policy, in MULTINATION-
ALS IN NORTH AMERICA, supra note 30, at 521.
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enforcement). Additionally, however, symbolic politics is involved. To
many political activists, GATT, NAFTA and other trade agreements
have come to symbolize environmental rape, corporate exploitation, a
social race to the bottom and other broad social problems flowing from
a much more complex set of factors.34 Governments will respond to
such claims, either unilaterally or cooperatively.
The question, therefore, is the extent to which governments, and
the people they represent, are prepared to tolerate difference6 in regula-
tory standards, values and national priorities within a more open global
economy. John Jackson has argued that dumping and countervailing
duties and safeguard measures were necessary to lubricate the tensions
that arise from such systems friction.35 As the scope of systems friction
widens, the need to enlarge the role of these lubricating measures simi-
larly needs to expand.
Negotiating about these issues need not be an economically nega-
tive experience. Business leaders and neoclassical economists are con-
cerned that such politically motivated agreements will reduce the scope
for economically rational decisions, at a cost to individual businesses as
well as the economy as a whole. The evidence to support this fear is not
robust. Not all regulation, domestic or international, need have a nega-
tive economic impact. The international experience in setting product
standards has generally been positive. The standards have been high
and industry compliance has been good. Rather than leading to losses
in competitiveness, it has led to the development of higher product and
process standards. More generally, there is sufficient evidence to sug-
gest that stronger rules, domestic or international, often lead to higher
and more uniform standards and enforcement practices in the jurisdic-
tions involved which in turn lead to stronger competitors. Generally,
consumers will pay a premium for quality. Efforts by quality-conscious
firms to deliver quality and reduce the premium usually pay dividends.
Michael Porter has argued that tough regulatory standards breed
strong competitors. The history of Japanese industrial development pro-
vides suggestive evidence. In the 1950s and 1960s, Japanese products
were cheap, generally of low quality, and created little fear among Eu-
ropean or American competitors. By the 1980s, exactly the opposite
held true. Spurred on in part by tough regulatory requirements, Japa-
nese products were expensive, reflecting very high quality standards,
while Japanese-based firms were among those most feared by European
'4 This aspect of the debate has its corrosive aspect, feeding xenophobic and even racist
prejudices. The argument suggests that third-world citizens are not like us and should not be
admitted to the club. It is ironic that the churches have been so strongly associated with these
symbolic politics. See Mayer, The NAFTA, Multinationals and Social Policy, in MULTINATION-
ALS IN NORTH AMERICA, supra note 30, at 518-19.
" John Jackson, Achieving a Balance in International Trade, 2 INT'L Bus. LAW. 123-28
(1986).
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and American competitors. GATT's own history also reflects the in-
sight of this observation. More stringent obligations have been imposed
on the wealthier members while more permissive rules have governed
the trade regimes of the poorer members. Perversely, the obligation to
live up to tougher requirements has helped to strengthen the economies
of the wealthy members while the weaker obligations assumed by de-
veloping countries hindered their economic development.
Thus, while the economic case may be weak and the political case
strong, pursuit of political objectives may, in the end, lead to desirable
economic consequences, i.e., the development of global firms and indus-
tries able to meet stringent global regulatory requirements and capable
of delivering quality products at competitive prices.
VI. SOVEREIGNTY, EXTRA-TERRITORIALITY AND UNILATERALISM
While conceding the political case, some will still object, con-
cerned that the development of international rules governing social pol-
icy issues will lead to a serious erosion of national sovereignty. Such
sentiments display a lack of historical perspective and appreciation of
current reality. The concept of sovereignty as currently conceived is of
rather recent vintage, the result of an historical evolution of no more
than a few centuries, largely confined to Western Europe and more
recently North America. Based on this evolution, the term conveys not
only ideas about territorial and national integrity, but also about the
conduct of relations between states and their role in the establishment
and management of international regimes.
It was not until the sixteenth century that the royal territorial
state began to take discernible shape, replacing the flexible concepts of
personal fealty that had governed social arrangements in the middle
ages. There was gradual recognition that the sovereign exercised con-
trol over a defined geographic area, i.e., was able to exercise sover-
eignty over that territory. For this concept to work, it required not only
that people resident in the territory accept the king's suzerainty, but
that one monarch recognize the territorial sovereignty of another. To
this end, European courts developed rules of behavior to govern rela-
tions between them. The first mature expression of such rules is usually
identified with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Concomitant with the
development of the territorial state came theories not only of the duty
of its residents to the sovereign, but also of the duty of the sovereign to
those living within his territory. Thus both the concepts and practice of
governance and sovereignty developed in tandem.
By the nineteenth century, the territorial state had acquired na-
tional characteristics, i.e., government and territory were presumed to
be synonymous with a people with a shared language and other cultural
attributes. By this time, the functions of government had also grown to
include not only defense of the state's territorial integrity, but also of
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its national identity. Concurrently, the rules of inter-state behavior had
also become more sophisticated, particularly during the long Pax Bri-
tannia. Sovereign governments now entered into an increasing range of
treaty obligations and established international regimes to ensure the
smooth operation of such international functions as the delivery of the
mail and the regulation of issues ranging from copyright to tariffs. In
effect, these rules were based on a shared acceptance that sovereigns
could cede some of their ability to act independently in return for the
benefits that were presumed to come from cooperative joint action.
Over the course of the twentieth century, the attributes of the na-
tion-state grew further to embrace the social welfare state. By the mid-
dle of the century, attributes of the nation-state included not only terri-
torial and national integrity, but also the capacity to promote the
economic and social well-being of its citizens. At the same time, the
post-war system of multilateral rules and organizations became the lat-
est expression of rules to govern inter-state relations. As with the ex-
pansion in the attributes of the nation-state, the range of issues ad-
dressed by the rules of inter-state relations had similarly expanded.
Today we face a new reality. Advances in transportation and com-
munications technology have made it possible to breach the territorial,
social and cultural integrity of the nation-state on a daily basis. The
convergence of popular cultures and the crisis of the welfare state all
point to the need to develop a new definition of sovereignty as well as a
new set of norms and rules for inter-state relations. In short, we need a
new set of rules that recognizes that the realm of goods, services, capi-
tal and technology has largely escaped from the effective regulation of
the territorial nation-state, while its people remain largely attached to
it.36
In effect, such a regime may end up recapturing political authority
that has been lost as a result of the silent integration flowing from the
forces of globalization.37 Even more to the point, cooperative, jointly
agreed international rules may provide an effective antidote to the tyr-
anny of unilateralism by the powerful. The most potent threat to the
sovereignty of most nation-states today comes not from the fruits of
'" As Robert Reich has noted, only a small elite can as yet escape the bonds of the territorial
nation-state - those he characterizes as symbolic analysts. See THE WORK OF NATIONS: PREPAR-
ING OURSELVES FOR 21sT CENTURY CAPITALISM (Alfred A. Knopf, 1991).
37 Notes Frederick Mayer:
Rather than contributing to the further empowerment of private actors [NAFTA] may, in
fact, be the beginnings of a recapture of power by states, either by facilitating greater coop-
eration among them or by creating supranational institutions capable of addressing social
issues on a regional basis. To the extent that economic activity - trade and investment -
becomes increasingly regional, rather than either national or global, what may be developing
is a political architecture more coincident with the economic landscape.
Mayer, The NAFTA, Multinationals and Social Policy, in MULTINATIONALS IN NORTH
AMERICA, supra note 30, at 522.
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cooperative action but from the extra-territorial application of unilat-
eral definitions of appropriate standards by the United States. 8
The United States is the only country that has a strongly devel-
oped body of doctrine and practice favoring the extra-territorial appli-
cation of its laws, based on its strong sense of mission and manifest
destiny. In some cases, the United States proceeds extra-territorially in
order to pursue clearly established U.S. interests or defend U.S. citi-
zens. In others, extra-territoriality involves the simple extension of U.S.
values and other political priorities to other jurisdictions. Traditionally,
U.S. extra-territoriality involved matters related to antitrust cases, na-
tional security (export controls) and the compulsion of foreign disclos-
ure in the context of U.S. litigation. Additionally, however, it can also
be used to pursue human rights issues, environmental protection, labor
matters, securities, drug and racketeering enforcement and intellectual
property protection. The U.S. legal doctrine of extra-territoriality thus
means that as the global economy becomes more integrated and the
U.S. economy becomes more globalized, the potential for more adven-
tures in this area is very real.39
U.S. willingness to apply its laws beyond its frontiers thus poses a
serious threat to global commerce and the development of appropriate
global rules and institutions. In effect, the U.S. authorities appear pre-
pared to determine who are "outlaw" nations and what are "outlaw"
values and act accordingly. Outside of the United States, there is broad
acceptance of three basic principles that would seem to place the uni-
lateral reach for jurisdiction outside a nation's territory beyond the
pale: acceptance of the sovereign equality of states; agreement that one
government cannot frustrate or undermine the law or policy of another;
and the maxim that national laws must reflect self-limitation that re-
spects the sovereignty of other nations (comity). For more than 300
years, international law has recognized these principles except where
states have voluntarily ceded authority to another or to an international
organization or regime. The United States, however, has never ac-
cepted them.40
Even in the absence of a U.S. doctrine of extra-territoriality, the
size and dominance of the United States market in the global economy
38 I am indebted for the ideas and analysis in this section to a paper prepared by Doug
Rosenthal, The Greening of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in U.S. Law (to be published).
" In recent years, the U.S. Congress and the courts have begun to assert a "universal" juris-
diction over such issues as human rights and the environment. They have also indicated a willing-
ness to challenge the application of another country's law in its own territory, as they did during
the infamous uranium cartel case and in the kidnapping by U.S. law enforcement officers of al-
leged criminals in Canada and Mexico. Congress has even shown it is prepared to pass legislation
to punish behavior in one jurisdiction compelled by the government of that jurisdiction, even when
such action is at odds with US interests or standards. Id.
,0 See id. for a fuller discussion of these principles and the extent to which the United States
stands outside them.
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have in the past created a strong disposition for U.S. legislative and
legal action to be determinative in the making of international rules.
This was a natural by-product of the hegemony enjoyed by the United
States during the post-war years.4 As a result, American negotiators
were conditioned to assume not only that their objectives were in the
interest of the United States, but were morally superior to all others.
There simply was no other point of view that needed to be taken seri-
ously. For the United States, rule-based international regimes have
thus often meant the extension of U.S. rules and procedures to the rest
of the world. The GATT, for example, bears a remarkable resemblance
to many of the provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930. Section 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974, which provides for unilateral police action in the
trade and economic sphere, is often used to condition others to conform
to U.S. norms. In a regime where the norm is often American, it is not
unnatural for the United States to arrogate to itself the right to act as
its arbiter. While annoying, this exercise of hegemony has not been
without benefit. It created an ordered world and it committed the
United States to a set of rules that had the virtue of stability. Those
rules could not be changed without the consent of other participants.
However, in a world where power is much more widely dispersed
and the sources of legitimacy are more widespread, unilateralism, par-
ticularly by the major player, breeds anarchy and contempt. Even
where an individual instance of U.S. unilateralism may have beneficial
effects for many of the participants in the system, the broader implica-
tions are such as to bring the whole system into question. Too often, it
also smacks of protectionism and displays an arrogance that has no
place in a well-functioning global trading system. The rule of law no
longer applies. In its place, power rules the day and, in the absence of a
hegemon, even the more powerful players will suffer the results of this
lawlessness.
U.S.-based firms have begun to appreciate this shift in reality.
Gone are the days when the U.S. economy did not need the global
economy but the rest of the world needed the U.S. market. The United
States now relies on the rest of the world for a growing share of its
goods, services, capital and technology. U.S.-based actors now have sig-
nificant stakes beyond the shores of the United States and non-U.S.-
based firms have important stakes in the U.S. market. In such circum-
stances, determining 'national' interests becomes increasingly strained;
one soon comes to the inevitable conclusion that rules-based interna-
tionalism is the only game worth the candle.
Economic internationalism today means the development of a
global regime consonant with the new reality of a global economy.
41 See ROBERT GILPIN. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 72-80
(Princeton University Press, 1987), for a discussion of the theory of hegemonic stability.
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American commentators are beginning to get their minds around the
concepts involved and the radically different ways in which the United
States must pursue its interests in a post-hegemonic world. They are
learning that while the United States may still be critical to the func-
tioning of the global economy, it can no longer insist on its views as to
how that economy should operate. It may be the biggest and most in-
fluential player, but it is no longer the hegemon.
Most American opinion and decision-makers, however, still have a
long way to go. The practical result is that the world will have to suffer
the fallout from this learning experience, whether it involves Japan-
bashing, wars of words across the Atlantic, or skirmishes against Cana-
dian wheat and other products. Eventually, however, even Americans
will come to see the logic of the global economy and the benefits of
rules-based internationalism. It is now in the interest of the United
States to cooperate and accommodate the needs and views of others.
WHY TRADE AGREEMENTS?
If we accept that political considerations will drive governments of
major nations to continue to press for accommodation on such issues as
fair labor standards and environmental protection, we must then ask
whether trade agreements are the appropriate vehicle to address these
issues. In an ideal world, the answer should properly be no. Trade bu-
reaucrats are not the best officials to address the complexities of fair
labor standards or other social issues, nor are trade agreements neces-
sarily the best instruments for addressing them. Steve Charnovitz ar-
gues that GATT, for example, is not a good vehicle for dealing with
environmental or labor issues. It is not geared to separating "good"
from "bad" trade; rather, it establishes rules about trade restrictions.
GATT article XX(b), for example, does not forbid trade in dangerous
products; it permits governments to restrict imports of such products.
He notes that "at present, the GATT is a long way from even acknowl-
edging a fundamental question: Are international rules needed so that
countries will not suffer a comparative disadvantage from protecting
the environment and providing basic safeguards for workers?" '42
Charnovitz is right. In a well structured world of international
rules and institutions, the ILO, for example, would set labor-market
rules and manage procedures for review, compliance and enforcement.
The ILO, however, has no credible record in the establishment of en-
forceable rules and in supervisory and compliance procedures.43 Other
42 Steve Charnovitz, Environmental and Labour Standards in Trade, 15-3 THE WORLD
ECONOMY, 353 (May 1992).
43 The ILO International Labour Code, for example, provides a poor model for the future.
Part of the reason lies in the failure of the ILO to distinguish between conventions, recommenda-
tions and model codes of practice, guides, manuals and safety regulations, including a host of
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international agreements and organizations in the social field have simi-
lar shortcomings. As a result, trade agreements will continue to be the
focus for addressing these domestic policy issues internationally. Gall-
ing as this may be to some, it makes political sense because the
problems and challenges such policies pose in intergovernmental rela-
tions frequently first manifest themselves in the context of international
trade. Until governments are prepared to enter into self-executing in-
ternational agreements enforced by domestic courts, trade agreements
may thus provide the most effective way of enforcing international
rules governing such policies and resolving international conflicts - in-
tergovernmental or intercorporate - that may arise as a result of
them.
There is, of course, a middle ground. It is possible to negotiate the
substantive issues in separate labor, environmental and other agree-
ments but include provisions for enforcement through trade measures.
To avoid any significant erosion of the benefits of an open international
economy, however, the application of such sanctions would need to be
consistent with the rules of the trade regime and be supervised by it.
The objective would be to ensure that trade sanctions would only be
used as a last resort, after more positive measures to achieve the de-
sired result had been exhausted. To achieve this objective would require
the negotiation of appropriate cross-walks between trade and other
agreements, similar to the cross-walks originally negotiated between
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the GATT to deal with
trade measures for balance-of-payments reasons or between the Cus-
toms Cooperation Council and GATT on customs issues. It should be
possible to negotiate provisions in the World Trade Organization
(WTO) on how and under what circumstances trade measures are to
be applied to enforce substantive obligations adopted in other agree-
ments, e.g., environmental or labor standards.
Nevertheless, while the forum would be more appropriate, the is-
sues would be the same: the negotiation of substantive rules and their
sector-specific standards. The result is a massive and confusing code that is at least ten times as
detailed as the densest national regulations. By mid-1992, the ILO had 160 members who had
adopted 173 conventions (162 in force) and 180 recommendations for a total of more than 4,600
provisions. Each member state has ratified an average of 33 conventions for a total of 5,500 ratifi-
cations, creating an immense supervisory task. It is no wonder that over the years the supervisory
function has been scaled down and become increasingly perfunctory. The existence of an over-
abundance of instruments also devalues the half dozen or so that are of qualitative importance.
Additionally, the much ballyhooed tripartite nature of the organization is not reflected in practice.
Many of the member states' employers' and workers' representatives participate only sporadically
and most member states discharge their reporting obligations less than enthusiastically. The
United States, which is actively seeking to strengthen international fair labor standards through
the GATT, has a less than exemplary record of ratifications - only 11 - although its record of
compliance is good. See Efr6n Cord6va, Some Reflections on the Overproduction of International
Labour Standards, 14 CoMP. LAB. L.J., 138-162.
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enforcement, under specified circumstances, by trade sanctions. One
way or another, therefore, the interface between trade and social policy
will have to be confronted and it is more likely to arise in the context of
trade negotiations than elsewhere. It is necessary, therefore, to develop
a clear understanding of the nature of international trade agreements
before we get into a discussion of whether or not they can serve as
useful vehicles for addressing the new range of issues.
All trade agreements today can be characterized as forming part
of the GATT-based trade relations system, i.e., they are all broadly
consistent with the rules and procedures set out in the GATT. When
first negotiated, GATT was conceived as an intergovernmental agree-
ment that regulated what governments could and could not do to influ-
ence the flow of goods across their frontiers. In 1947, such measures
were largely confined to border measures, particularly tariffs and quan-
titative restrictions. The resulting rules were held together by the prin-
ciple of non-discrimination. Members had to treat goods crossing the
border without regard to their origin and, once goods had satisfied the
GATT-sanctioned frontier requirements, members could not discrimi-
nate between domestic and foreign goods.
By the 1980s, however, GATT had evolved into a much more com-
plex arrangement. Rather than relying on a traditional diplomatic ap-
proach to resolving disputes, its members had gradually pioneered the
development of judicial-like international procedures. Rather than
maintaining a code of broad principles, GATT's members had devel-
oped a construction of detailed rules and procedures. By the 1990s,
GATT's rules covered not only goods, but also services, investment and
technology. In the original GATT regime, member countries had
traded access in one market for access to another market. The new
WTO, on the other hand, will deal with the terms of trade at a global
level. In a global economy, the terms of trade should involve not only
negative prescriptions about what governments may do at the border,
but also positive norms about their approach to environmental protec-
tion, their regulation of labor markets and other social issues. The
GATT experience thus suggests the extent to which member govern-
ments have been prepared gradually to enlarge the scope for interna-
tionally regulating government behavior and extending international
regulatory authority.
The negotiation of a code governing the protection of intellectual
property during the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations provides a
case in point. Governments agreed that they would extend a specified
level of protection to the owners of intellectual property and use trade
sanctions to enforce them. Such protection will be provided by all
GATT members to all owners of intellectual property rights, regardless
of their residence or place of business. In effect, governments have now
agreed that among the terms of trade that will apply in the global
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economy is a guarantee of the property rights of owners of intellectual
property. It is not difficult to conceive how that same pattern of rule-
making can be applied to other kinds of rights and conditions.
At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that the GATT
regime does not regulate production, trade or investment per se. It does
not say what may be produced where, what may be traded and how
that trade is to be conducted. Rather, it provides a set of rules about
how member governments can regulate trade and investment between
them. The parties that are regulated are not private parties but na-
tional states. The system does not confer rights and obligations on indi-
viduals, but on member states.
Populist critics of the current trade regime argue that it is based
on the neo-classical market model and aims at providing free rein to
market forces by constraining the capacity of governments to regulate.
Its main beneficiaries are perceived to be internationally competitive
firms. They argue that the GATT rules involve a capitulation by demo-
cratic governments to global firms and institutions that are not respon-
sible to any electorate.
International trade agreements, of course, can be constructed to
serve a wide variety of ends. To date, however, experience contradicts
the charge that they foster such an irresponsible regime. Rather, the
GATT rules provide a framework within which governments establish
their own priorities and schemes of regulation. Product standards pro-
vide a good example. Governments are not prevented from setting
product standards, but they are constrained from using them as overt
barriers to trade. With the exception of removing highly inefficient bor-
der barriers such as tariffs and quotas, trade agreements rarely estab-
lish free trade. Rather, they reflect an international consensus on an
appropriate regulatory regime based on the virtue of non-discrimina-
tion. Individual countries retain tremendous scope for intervention,
which is why both left and right remain unhappy: these agreements
represent compromises between competing values and priorities rather
than ideological straitjackets.
Thus, while the trade regime may not be the ideal place to resolve
intergovernmental and interfirm conflict about social issues, they pro-
vide an adequate, second-best framework. What will be required is the
development of appropriate working relationships between trade offi-
cials and those responsible for social issues. For trade negotiators,
working with other subject specialists is nothing new. Fifty years ago,
trade negotiations dealt largely with tariffs and quotas, i.e., government
policy measures applied at the border. Trade negotiators, therefore,
were usually drawn from among those people who had some experience
in dealing with these matters. But as the boundaries of trade negotia-
tions have expanded, trade negotiators have of necessity learned to deal
with a much wider range of issues. Doing so required that they learn to
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"share" their file. Over the past few years, they have learned to work
with industrial policy specialists, government procurement experts,
competition lawyers, service industry regulators, product health and
safety inspectors and more. Each of these fields has its own assump-
tions, goals and sensitivities. As a result, relations have not always been
easy, but both sides have adjusted, made the necessary compromises
and managed to serve the national interest as defined by the govern-
ment of the day.
WHAT WOULD BE INVOLVED?
Having established that there is a good political case for address-
ing social policy issues in the trade negotiations of the future, what
exactly would such negotiations involve? Moving from trade agree-
ments that address how societies regulate commerce (the exchange of
goods, services, capital and technology) to agreements that regulate
how societies govern themselves (their social arrangements, the protec-
tion of the environment, the regulation of competition and the protec-
tion of private property) involves more than a simple extension of the
existing trade regime. The historical, cultural, social and political
forces that have shaped how societies have arranged such matters can-
not be ignored. Negotiating international standards on such emotive is-
sues thus presents a formidable challenge, spurred on by the threat that
in the absence of multilateral rules, the vacuum will be filled by unilat-
eral action.
A good place to begin would be to determine the extent to which
existing GATT principles and practices would apply. GATT negotia-
tions have traditionally involved two reinforcing bargaining strategies.
The first revolves around a set of negative prescriptions. The GATT
rules respecting non-discrimination, tariffs, quantitative restrictions,
balance-of-payments measures and trade remedies all involve self-deny-
ing ordinances: governments agree not to engage in certain policies and
practices and thus let the market determine winners and losers. These
negative prescriptions are susceptible to an exchange of concessions,
i.e., each government can deny something in return for another govern-
ment denying something of similar value. In this way, governments are
able to exchange politically risky increases in import competition for
politically rewarding increases in export opportunities within a fixed-
rule order that guarantees stability.
The second strategy is grounded in the commitment to most-fa-
vored-nation treatment and the organization of negotiations around the
principal-supplier rule. It means that bargaining about exchanges of
concessions is based on market power, i.e., the largest economies ex-
change concessions among each other which are then multilateralized
for the benefit of all the other participants. Smaller countries, having
little to offer in terms of economically significant markets, are
[Vol. 20:351 1994
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marginalized both in terms of the concessions they can offer and the
specific concessions they can seek. Nevertheless, they gain considerably
from the concessions traded among the larger economies and the over-
all effect of the process is liberalizing. Following the lead of the major
powers thus makes both political and economic sense for the smaller
powers and ensures commitment to a regime dominated by a few major
players.
These two fundamental characteristics of the GATT trade rela-
tions system of the 1950s through the 1970s, however, seem ill-suited to
the development of rules about social issues. Substantive obligations in
such areas as environmental protection and fair labor standards require
governments to go beyond self-denying ordinances and enter into posi-
tive obligations, i.e., to conform to international standards. Bargaining
about norms and standards is not as easily organized on the basis of
market power. In most cases, the norms are those of the major powers
who insist that they do not have to make major adjustments." It is the
smaller powers that will have to make the most significant concessions,
but without the politically necessary counterweight of gaining addi-
tional access to the markets of the large powers. While there may be
clear benefits to expanding the reach of a fixed-rule international eco-
nomic order, such benefits are likely to be perceived more in economi-
cally than in politically persuasive terms.
Complicating matters even further, the number of countries ac-
tively participating in the negotiations has vastly increased. By the
middle of 1994, more than 120 countries were members of the GATT.
Many of these are small countries with a high stake in a successfully
functioning multilateral trading order but with little to offer to make it
work better or to unblock stalemate. Thus, in proceeding to the next
stage of global rule-making, GATT's basic rules and procedures may
need to adapt to a new range of issues.
GATT's basic principles can be divided into two sets: procedural
and substantive. The first group involves such matters as due process,
collective decision-making and transparency. There is little potential
44 The complexity of the issues involved was well illustrated by the U.S.-Japan Structural
Impediments Initiative (SII). Conflicting views of how to approach domestic and international
economic issues were explored at a level of detail that at times bordered on the bizarre. Both sides
complained about the different values and priorities of the other side with the United States
strongly suggesting that if Japan were prepared to become more American, many of the trade
frictions would disappear. Such discussions are difficult enough bilaterally; they would be even
more difficult multilaterally and suggest the need for careful preparation regarding both substance
and technique in future discussion of social policy issues. See Amelia Porges, U.S.-Japan Trade
Negotiations: Paradigms Lost, TRADE WITH JAPAN: HAS THE DOOR OPENED WIDER? (Paul
Krugman, ed., The University of Chicago Press, 1991) and Michael Mastanduno, Framing the
Japan problem: The Bush administration and the Structural Impediments Initiative, XLVII
INT'L J., 235-264 (Spring, 1992). Jagdish Bhagwati in THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM AT RISK
also explores some of the complexities of negotiating rules about the new issues.
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for controversy here, although GATT's application of these principles
may need some further refinement. For example, environmentalists
criticize GATT's failure to live by its own precepts. In GATT, trans-
parency means that the rules that govern trade should be widely availa-
ble and that national tribunals should provide opportunity for all sides
to be heard. GATT members, however, have been reluctant to open
their deliberations in Geneva to greater public scrutiny. Those delibera-
tions reflect GATT's diplomatic heritage and have not as yet caught up
to its more modern quasi-judicial nature. If GATT's procedures are to
achieve the legitimacy required to address such delicate social issues as
labor standards, they will need to become more transparent and there
will have to be wider participation in rule-making and dispute
settlement.
More difficult issues are raised by the substantive principles that
underpin GATT rules: national treatment and most-favored-nation
treatment. As we have seen, these are concepts that lend themselves
well to rules about exchanges of goods and have proven reasonably ap-
plicable to investment and services, but may not be wholly suitable to
the development of substantive rules about social issues. In effect, rules
governing such social issues as labor standards and environmental pro-
tection will require establishing process standards, i.e., setting rules not
about products and their consumption but about the way products are
made.
National treatment is the basic cornerstone of the GATT ap-
proach to the regulation of trade in goods. It means that in the home
market, governments must not impose different requirements on foreign
products than they impose on those of domestic origin. It does not
mean that governments can expect that exported products will be
treated everywhere the way the government of the exporting country
treats those products.
It is difficult to use the national treatment standard, however, as
the basis for process standards. To do so would amount to its perver-
sion. The product standard basically aims at protecting consumption or
use in the regulating government's market; a process standard basically
aims at protecting production in the regulating government's territory.
To extend that concept by insisting that the process by which a product
is produced must meet a national treatment test is to establish extra-
territoriality as a fundamental rule of international trade. That is a
point of departure that only large countries can afford to take and, as
we have seen, makes increasingly little sense even for them.
A few examples illustrate the problem. Muslim countries may de-
cide that they will not allow the sale of products from factories that
operate during Ramadan or on other high holidays. Saudi Arabia may
prohibit the sale of products from establishments that employ women.
South Africa may ban the sale of products from countries or factories
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that do not maintain strict Sunday closing laws. Each of these in-
stances may meet the national treatment rule, but they would each
amount to an absurd intrusion by one country into the affairs of an-
other.45 To make the point even more sharply, should Canada decide
that it will no longer trade with a country that still maintains the death
penalty, the United States would rightly regard such a decision as ei-
ther a mischievous effort to justify protectionism or an unwarranted
and intolerable intrusion into its domestic affairs.
The simple solution, of course, is harmonization. The question then
arises, harmonize to whose standard? The inevitable answer would be
to the standards set in the large and powerful economies. While there
may be instances where such an approach makes sense, in many other
circumstances it would not. It is not reasonable to insist that all coun-
tries must conform to the social preferences of the powerful. There are
perfectly rational reasons why various societies make divergent social
choices. California's climactic and geographic circumstances might dis-
pose its citizens to choose very stringent air pollution standards while
the people of Saskatchewan could as rationally choose lower standards.
Such social choices should not necessarily give rise to trade actions.
Similarly, rules about maximum hours of work that make sense in a
large metropolitan setting may make little sense in rural circumstances.
The United States, which boasts a large but well integrated continental
market, has not found it necessary for the fifty states to harmonize
much of their social legislation. The same logic would seem to apply for
an even more diverse global economy.
In the elaboration of a new GATT standards code, governments
have gained some experience in developing rules based on the more
sensible and less intrusive concept of mutual recognition, i.e., govern-
ments agreed that similar objectives can be met by a range of different
standards and procedures. Rather than negotiating about detailed
rules, they have limited negotiation to agreement about basic objectives
and have let individual governments determine how those objectives are
best met for their societies. Such an approach, with suitable adaptation,
might be amenable to what is needed in the field of social policy.
Whatever approach is adopted, there will be a need to distinguish
between standards or rights whose contravention is clearly an affront to
human dignity and decency and those that should flow from market
outcomes. In the area of labor standards, for example, it is necessary to
distinguish between such basic rights as freedom of association, collec-
tive bargaining, exploitive child labor and deliberately unsafe and un-
healthy working conditions and those which are the result of market
outcomes such as wages, hours and conditions of work. Instituting a
" See Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict?,
29-4 WASH. & LEE L. REV., 1227-1277 (Fall, 1992).
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fair labor relations process, for example, will not lead automatically to
rising and more equitably distributed wages when labor is in plentiful
supply. Nor do higher wages necessarily require a particular labor rela-
tions process. In some countries, the best choice among a bad lot can
still be very bad, no matter how fair the labor relations process. The
real objective for most workers then, quite logically, is more good jobs.
To insist on high labor standards - process and substantive - is often
to deny progress toward that more fundamental goal.46
Finally, considerable attention will need to be devoted to the devel-
opment of appropriate enforcement procedures. For some, existing an-
tidumping and countervailing duty proceedings offer a model. In effect,
GATT rules would provide cover for unilateral action by member
states based on domestic complaints procedures and domestically deter-
mined standards, rules and procedures. Given the rather checkered his-
tory of antidumping and countervailing duty procedures, this is not an
approach that would seem to recommend itself to most members of the
global community. They are particularly repugnant to those countries
who are likely to be at the receiving end of such actions. Analysts com-
mitted to open markets find them similarly abhorrent. A more suitable
approach would involve multilateral supervisory, compliance and en-
forcement procedures in an appropriate institutional setting, the main
aim of which would be compliance rather than sanctions.
One practical way to proceed would be to negotiate international
rules of fair competition that include basic labor standards, minimum
levels of environmental protection and similar provisions, within the
framework and enforcement mechanisms of international trade agree-
ments. The basis for such standards can be found in the core standards
elaborated by the ILO, UNEP and other international organizations.
The effect of such a code would not be to reduce competition between
high-wage and low-wage economies, but to ensure that an internation-
ally agreed level of obligation governs the behavior of firms in the
global economy. The quid pro quo would be that the establishment of
such standards would outlaw their unilateral pursuit.
Other approaches can also be explored. What is no longer an ac-
ceptable option is to continue to insist that the world does not need
international rules to govern the much more complex and intense level
of integration that has developed over the last few decades. The reality
is that the world of commerce has already made large strides in adapt-
ing to the transformation from an interlinked set of national economies
to an integrated, denationalized global economy. What is missing is an
appropriate set of rules to minimize intergovernmental and intercorpo-
rate conflict. In its absence, large powerful economies will set their own
46 See Gary Fields, Labor Standards, Economic Development, and International Trade, in
LABOR STANDARDS AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (1990).
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rules and impose them on the less powerful, ushering in an era of anar-
chy and lawlessness. No country can afford such a turn of events, in-
cluding the United States and Canada.
CONCLUSIONS
As suggested by the range of issues that will need to be addressed,
getting there will not be easy. Governments will need to develop con-
sensus on a potentially difficult group of issues, many of which chal-
lenge traditional concepts of sovereignty. To achieve the necessary in-
ternational consensus, governments will need to rely on a fresh supply
of intellectual capital generated either internally or in universities and
think tanks. New negotiating tools and techniques may be required as
well as more robust institutions and approaches to the resolution of
conflict. In effect, the next decade is likely to see a major reconsidera-
tion of the design, content and techniques of the international trade
regime.
For Canadians, the need to be active in the forefront of these de-
velopments cannot be overemphasized. Canada's dependence on and
benefits from an effectively functioning trade and payments system
have been well established. Its ability to play a constructive role has
been equally well documented. But an ability to ensure that Canadian
values and priorities are reflected in the evolving new regime requires
that Canadians think the issues through and make their contributions
early in the process. As a relatively small player, that is where they are
most likely to influence the content and course of a negotiation. In
short, they need to be quick, early and creative.
For Americans, the challenge is to learn to play a diminished but
still critical role. The United States can no longer forge consensus
among its trading partners through the exercise of hegemonic author-
ity, but it is still capable of blocking consensus. Achieving its goals,
therefore, will require that it learn to exercise a new kind of leadership,
one that is more prepared to compromise and accommodate the interest
of others while not losing sight of the main goal. Too often in the near
past, U.S. negotiators have failed to achieve a grand vision because of
their inability to accommodate others on small matters. The goal is a
better functioning global economy; the broad model is in many ways
the successful American version of the Western economy; the details,
however, need not be American. Indeed, the system is likely to be more
effective the more it is able to incorporate some of the more successful
aspects of other experiences. For Americans, psychologically condi-
tioned to see all things American as by definition superior, this will be
a hard lesson. It is a lesson that will need some deep reflection on the
nature of sovereignty in a global economy. It will require that the
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United States determine whether its sovereignty requires the continu-
ing use of its coercive power or a greater willingness to pursue coopera-
tive solutions and live with them.
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